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Summary 
The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an expert, announcing 
his probability that a particular state of the world will occur, and a non-expert decision-
maker, who takes action according to his posterior beliefs. The decision-maker 
considers the expert an experiment of uncertain reliability and takes the received 
messages as the outcomes of such an experiment. The model of the expert in the 
decision-maker’s mind bears no relation with any measure of the expert’s actual 
information. The paper shows that messages will be biased, notwithstanding solidarity 
between the agents. However, the longer the interaction, the less severe will be the bias. 
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The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an
expert, announcing his probability that a particular state of the world will
occur, and a non-expert decision-maker, who takes action according to his
posterior beliefs. The decision-maker considers the expert an experiment
of uncertain relaibility and takes the received messages as the outcomes of
such an experiment. The model of the expert in the decision-maker’s mind
bears no relation with any measure of the expert’s actual information.
The paper shows that messages will be biased, notwithstanding solidarity
between the agents. However, the longer the interaction, the less severe
will be the bias.
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1 Introduction
It is tautological that a manager will expect low productivity from a subor-
dinate he judges to be incompetent. Equally, a subordinate will expect poor
results from obeying a superior reputed to be unreliable. While the concern of
an employee for being positively evaluated by his manager has been analyzed
from various perspectives, (such as inﬂuence activities (Milgrom (1988) and the
theory of yes-men (Prendergast (1993)), just to quote a few), on the contrary,
the leadership role that a manager can exert, just because his competence is
highly regarded by his subordinates, has possibly received less attention. That
leadership role is the speciﬁc focus of the present paper and it is shown to be sig-
niﬁcant independently of incentive concerns. In particular, the issues addressed
by the paper are the following:
a) under which conditions is a manager’s credibility crucial for his subordi-
nates’ behaviour?
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1b) Can the manager’s concern about his own reputation aﬀect the instruc-
tions he gives to his subordinates?
Especially in large organizations, a person’s immediate hierarchical supe-
rior is often his oﬃcial source of information and instructions. Information and
instructions concern variables that the receiver knows to be relevant for his
productivity, but that can be beyond his scope of direct observation or under-
standing. In this sense, hierarchical superiors can be said to act in the quality
of experts with respect to their subordinates. When the subordinate receives
instructions deriving from variables beyond his competence, he cannot but take
those instructions very much like the opinion of the sender, rather than decod-
able and self-explaining data. In this sense, instructions can be considered a
very special case of soft information: when even instructions consist of logical
and incontrovertible inferences from freely available hard information, the re-
ceiver who lacks the knowledge indispensable for repeating the same inferences1
will face a sort of ”ideological” problem. In this special but not infrequent case,
cheap talk itself between the sender and the receiver of instructions, i.e. the ex-
change of non-veriﬁable messages of any given length or complexity, may be of
no particular help in building up the credibility of the sender. On the contrary,
short instructions may actually achieve the same results of long messages.
The present paper is just concerned with:
a) the use of the expert’s advice by a non-expert decision-maker, and
b) the impact of that use on the reporting of predictions by the expert.
The paper considers the case in which both expert and decision-maker are
solidaristic, but the decision-maker can only rely upon his personal assessment
of the expert’s credibility in taking account of the expert’s judgement.
In particular, the non-expert is uncertain about the current state of nature,
that can be either low or high in every period. The non-expert has a 50-50 prior
that the current state is low. The expert sends to the non-expert a message
to be interpreted as the announced probability that the current state of nature
is low. The distinctive assumption of the paper is the following: the non-
expert considers the expert himself an experiment of uncertain reliability and
takes the received messages as the outcomes of such an experiment. Hence,
at the beginning of every period, the non-expert will have a density function
for the expert’s credibility, where a particular level of credibility corresponds
to a pair of likelihood functions of the current message, each one conditional
on a speciﬁc realization of the state of the world. The non-expert will use his
density function for the expert’s credibility in order to derive the likelihood
functions of the current message, conditional on the state of the world. Those
functions represent the non-expert’s current subjective measure of the expert’s
credibility, and they are combined with the expert’s message in updating the
non-expert’s prior about the current state. The model of the expert used by
the non-expert is known by the expert. At the end of every period, all the
agents can observe the realized state of nature, and the non-expert will revise
1As an example, I can read the results of my clinical tests, but I am unable to draw any
inference from them.
2his model of the expert on the basis of the message sent by the expert and the
realized state. That is, at the end of each period the non-expert will update
his density function for the expert’s reliability. In every period, the non-expert
will take some action proportional to his posterior probability that the current
state is low. It is assumed that in every period the expert aims at minimizing
the squared distance between his probability that the current state is low and
the non-expert’s posterior.
The paper shows that, as long as the non-expert does not consider the expert
to be perfectly reliable, the expert will increase his current payoﬀ by reporting
a biased message. Distortion will work in the following way: agent E will
announce a low-state probability that is smaller than his true belief, when he
is less conﬁdent than a low state will occur; instead, agent E will announce
a low-state probability that is greater than his true belief, when he is more
conﬁdent than a low state will occur. In other words, agent E will exaggerate
his messages in order to make them ”loud and clear”. The worse is agent E’s
reputation according to agent N, the greater will be both the distortion in the
announced probability and the loss expected by agent E, just because agent N
is more insensitive to messages.
In case of repeated interaction, the expert will also be concerned about his
reputation in later periods. The paper shows that, in choosing the optimal
report of his predictions, the expert will face a trade-oﬀ between the current
accuracy of the perception of his judgement by the decision-maker and his fu-
ture credibility in the decision-maker’s view. It follows that agent E will keep
on exaggerating his report only when his true probability of a low state are
suﬃciently extreme. Instead, when agent E is suﬃciently uncertain about the
current state, to exaggerate his announced opinion will adversely aﬀect his ex-
pected reputation at the last period. In order to preserve credibility, and so to
keep control over future expected losses, agent E will accept a higher expected
loss today. As a result, messages will less biased with respect to the true beliefs
of the sender.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the
related literature, and, in Section 3 I describe the assumptions and the ba-
sic model. In Section 4 some preliminary results are obtained. Section 5 is
concerned with the one-period interaction and Section 6 with the two-period
interaction. In Section 6, I conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Work
The paper is an attempt to combine contributions from diﬀerent strands of
literature:
1) statistical models about the use of experts and the reporting of predic-
tions;
2) economic models about strategic information transmission and profes-
sional advice;
33) the theory of teams and the issue of interaction among agents in informa-
tionally decentralized organizations.
In the following I will refer only to the contributions most directly related
to the present paper since the relevant strands of literature hold a massive bulk
of important models, the extensive review of which would exceed the scope of
the present work.
1) The utilization of expert judgement
In French (1986) the expert problem is summarized in following way: a
decision-maker needs to assess his subjectivity probability for an event of in-
terest; having little substantive knowledge of the factors aﬀecting the event
of interest, the decision-maker asks another person for advice. The consulted
person is referred to as an expert. Although the word expert generally means
someone reputed to have some special knowledge2, in that literature an ex-
pert is anyone who can give predictions, i.e. anyone who can make probability
statements, called judgments or opinions, concerning the event of interest. The
problem is: how should the decision-maker incorporate an expert’s opinion into
his own?
Morris (1974, 1977), Lindley et al (1979), and French (1980) propose a
Bayesian modeling approach to the use of experts3. The decision-maker should
look upon the expert’s opinion simply as a piece of data: consulting an expert
is like performing an experiment, and just as the results of an experiment are
a priori unknown to an experimenter, so the expert’s advice is uncertain to the
decision maker prior to receiving it. In particular, following Morris (1974), who
generalizes the model to uncertain quantities and not just uncertain events, let
the probability density function assigned to the uncertain variable x, based on
the state of information δ, be denoted by {x | δ}. Speciﬁcally, let {x | d} and
{x | e} be the decision maker’s and the expert’s priors. How should the deci-
sion maker’s prior be altered upon reception of {x | e}? According to Morris
(1974), the only restriction to the decision-maker’s posterior assessment of the
variable x, conditioned on receiving the expert’s opinion, is that it is consistent
with both his prior knowledge about the variable and his appraisal of the ex-
pert. In particular, applying Bayes’ theorem, the decision maker’s assessment
of x conditioned on the fact that the expert’s prior is revealed to be {x | e} will
correspond to:
{x | {x | e},d} =
{{x | e} | x,d}{x | d}
{{x | e} | d}
where {{x | e} | x,d} is the likelihood function, that, as Morris point out,
is not the probability of a probability in the classical sense, but is the proba-
bility of the event that the expert’s prior is {x | e} given x. In other words,
the likelihood function is the model of the expert in the decision-maker’s view4.
2Expert is a person who is very knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area according
to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006).
3Related works are Morris (1983) and Genest-Schervish (1985).
4Morris (1974, p.1238):
Suppose a decision maker is considering the weather to determine the
prospects for a picnic. His view is that there is a 50-50 chance of rain....While
4Consequently, the likelihood function is the decision-maker’s subjective mea-
sure of the expert’s credibility5. According to Morris (1977), just because the
decision-maker interprets the reception of the expert’s advice as the outcome
of an experiment, a distinction is required between the meaning of an expert’s
probability assessment to the decision maker and the expert himself: the expert
views his probability assessment as a reﬂection of his state of information, in-
stead, the expert’s probability assessment is information to the decision-maker.
The present paper applies Morris’ idea of the non-expert’s subjective assess-
ment of the expert’s reliability to the relationship between a subordinate and
his hierarchical superior in a dynamic setting.
As far as the optimal reporting of predictions is concerned, the usual case
is that in which both expert and decision-maker are interested in assessing the
value of some parameter θ. In particular, the word expert is the label attached
to the agent who is going to observe some private new data Y . However, both
expert and decision-maker agree upon the conditional distribution for Y given θ
for all possible values of θ (Bayarri-DeGroot (1991)). The supposed consensus
upon the conditional distribution for private data given the unknown parameter
is the indispensable common ground for the interplay between Bayesian players.
In this way, expertise is a particular case of asymmetric information6.
Instead, the present paper moves from the assumption that the knowledge of
the decision-maker may be so poor that he may not have a clue about the con-
ditional distribution for Y given θ, but can just formulate his own personal as-
sessment of the expert’s credibility. The messages transmitted from superior to
subordinate can be seen as a sort of pathological case of soft information in that
hard information could be provided, but not understood by the non-expert7. If
the distinguishing characteristic of the expert is his diﬀerential knowledge, and
not just his informational advantage, the strategic interaction between expert
and decision-maker gets troublesome, as I will discuss later on.
2) Asymmetric information and strategic communication
In the economic literature concerning professional advice, asymmetric infor-
he is waiting for the weather report he ponders how he will use the weather-
man’s advice. He ﬁrst reason that the weatherman will state a probability of
rain p (shorthand for {R | e} where R denotes rain and R′ denotes no rain). The
decision maker ... makes a subjective appraisal of the dependence between the
expert’s advice and the actual weather. Speciﬁcally, he asks himself what his
assessment of p would be if an honest clairvoyant told him that it will surely rain
on his picnic...For any given value of p he can calculate the posterior probability
of rain to be:
{R | p,d} =
{p | R,d}{R | d}
{p | R,d}{R | d} + {p | R′,d}{R′ | d}
5The likelihhod function is related to the idea of calibration: according to Lindley (1982),
an expert is probability calibrated if the decision maker adopts the expert’s opinion for his
own. Other concepts of calibration are discussed by DeGroot-Fienberg (1983).
6Economic contributions following this approach are concerned with the issue of delegation
to self-interested experts who are the agents in a principal-agent relationship (for instance,
Li-Suen (2004) and Demski-Sappington (1987)).
7As an example, I can read the results of my clinical tests, but I am unable to draw any
inference from their values.
5mation is at the heart of what is commonly known as cheap talk between the
sender and the receiver of messages. In Crawford and Sobel (1982), a better
informed sender sends a possibly noisy signal to a receiver, who takes an ac-
tion that determines the welfare of both. The sender has observed the value
of a random variable that is modelled as his type. Equilibrium is shown to
involve noisy signaling unless the agents’ interests coincide. While in Crawford
and Sobel the focus is on strategic information transmission by a partisan ex-
pert who is interested in biasing the action of a decision-maker, Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2006a)8 consider a professional expert concerned about appearing to
be well informed, i.e. concerned with his reputation for ability. The expert
observes a private signal generated by a multiplicative linear experiment. The
expert’s unobserved ability parametrizes the amount of information about the
state of the world contained in the expert’s signal. After observing the signal,
the expert is free to publicly report any message. An evaluator combines the
expert’s message with the ex-post realization of the state to update the belief
regarding the expert’s ability. This posterior belief about ability is the expert’s
reputation and determines her payoﬀ. The quality of the expert’s information
is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world.
The signal that gives rise to the highest expected reputational payoﬀ is shown
to be typically diﬀerent from the signal actually observed.
The present paper takes from Crawford and Sobel the idea of a partisan
expert, in that the expert’s expected payoﬀ depends on the decision-maker’s
actions. However, while in Crawford and Sobel, equilibrium will not involve
noisy signals when the agents’ interests coincide9, in the present paper solidar-
ity is shown to be consistent with biased messages. The present paper takes
from Ottaviani and Sorensen the idea of reputation concern on the expert’s
side, that, however, descend from the assumption of both common interest and
repeated interaction between expert and decision-maker. In contrast with mod-
els of strategic information transmission, the adoption of Morris’ approach to
the use of expert’s advice by the decision-maker makes this paper depart from
the usual game-theoretic approach. The reason is that the decision-maker will
resort to his own model of the expert and, consistently, the usual game-theoretic
concept of types for the experts seems to be only loosely appropriate. In this
way, the present paper is an attempt to pursue the intuition that the under-
lying diﬀerence between expert and non-expert is not private information, but
diﬀerential knowledge.
Credibility in information transmission is analyzed by Sobel (1985) for a
case in which an agent, the receiver, must decide whether to trust another, the
sender. The last one observes the value of a binary random variable and sends
a message to the receiver, who takes a decision aﬀecting the welfare of both
8Related papers by the same authors are Ottaviani-Sorensen (2006b) and (2006c). Quite
a diiferent approach to the expert problem is taken by the economic lietarure about credence
goods. In that case, fraud and cheating are the major problems in the interaction between
experts and consumers (for an extensive review, see Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)).
9Theu show that the amount of information revealed in equilibrium increases as the pref-
erences of the sender and the receiver become aligned.
6agents. The problem is that the receiver is uncertain about the preferences of
the sender, who can be a ”friend” or an ”enemy”. Repeated interaction between
the agents, coupled with veriﬁable information at the end of each period of
interaction, is shown to make it worthwhile for the receiver to build a reputation
for truthfulness10.
The present paper shares the same concern for credibility descending from
repeated interaction, but focuses on experts who are uncertain about the realized
state of the world, and on receivers who are uncertain about the experts’ ability
as probability assessors, and not about the senders’ preferences. In this way,
credibility is more the outcome of reliability than the result of honesty.
In the economic literature, the issue of opinions, and, more speciﬁcally, of
diﬀerences of opinions is often related to the discussion of the common prior
assumption and to diﬀerential interpretations of public signals. For instance, in
Harris and Raviv (1993), traders update their beliefs about an asset’s returns
using their own likelihood function of the relationship between public signals and
the asset’s returns. The fact that traders adopt diﬀerent likelihood functions
is common knowledge. Diﬀerent interpretations of the informative content of
public announcements is shown to be consistent with the volumes of trades in
speculative markets (Kandel and Pearson (1995)).
3) Hierarchies and informationally decentralized organizations
In the organization literature, hierarchies are built in order to save on in-
formation and knowledge costs. In this sense, a superior can be seen as an
expert who gives advice regarding stochastic variables to his subordinates. In
particular, the theory of teams by Marschak and Radner (1972) is an impressive
mechanism aimed at modeling decision rules for interdependent actions of soli-
daristic but informationally diﬀerentiated agents. In that context, information
is diversiﬁed in that diﬀerent agents can observe diﬀerent random variables, all
of them having an impact on the optimal team action proﬁle. Marschak and
Radner are concerned with the design of the team optimal communication struc-
ture. All the internally transmitted information is ”soft information”, that the
authors themselves call instructions in some special cases. Marschak and Rad-
ner focus on examples of noisy channels of communication yielding distortions in
the transmitted messages. The present paper follows the team approach in that
agents’ behaviour is aﬀected not by a conﬂict of interest, but by a particular
type of bias impairing the received messages. However, in the present paper,
messages can be distorted because they need to be subjectively interpreted by
the receivers, and not because they travel along noisy channels,.
The relevance of workers’ opinions or ideas is analyzed by Zabojnik (2002).
For a case of moral hazard, it is shown that it may be less costly to motivate
a worker who is allowed to work on his own ideas, rather than a worker who is
forced to follow the ideas of a better informed manager. In Zabojnik both worker
and manager observe signals of diﬀerent quality about the state of the word
that was realized, and the comparison is between decentralized vs. centralized
decision-making in a framework of conﬂict of interests. The present paper,
10Honesty in informal communication is further analysed by Olszewski (2204).
7instead, shows that, notwithstanding solidarity between the agents, the worker
will adhere to his manager’s instructions as much as the credibility he feels with
respect to his superior’s competence will let him.
An economic analysis of leadership is the issue of papers such as Rotenberg
and Saloner (1993) and Hermalin (1998). Rotenberg and Saloner are concerned
with incentive problems and show that leadership style can aﬀect the incentive
contracts that can be oﬀered to subordinates. Instead, in Hermalin leadership
is distinguished from authority because following a leader is perceived to be a
voluntary, rather than coerced, activity of the followers. Manager and workers
form a team à la Holmstrom (1982), the performance of which is impaired by
its members’ shirking, that descent from the team output-sharing agreement.
Leadership is analysed as the capacity to induce rational agents to exert eﬀort
in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them. The present
paper shares the idea that leadership is more sensitive to trust than authority
is. Again, trust and reactivity to instructions are shown to be relevant even in
cooperative situations.
Finally, the present paper and Prendergast’s (1993) theory of yes men may
be interpreted as diﬀerent faces of the same coin: Prendergast is concerned
with the reliability of the subordinate’s reports, here the problem lies with the
reputation and credibility of the manager.
3 Set-up
The paper is concerned with the relationship between two agents: an expert,
labelled E, and a non-expert decision-maker, labelled N. In particular:
Assumption 1 :
1) the state of the world at time t, denoted by ωt, is either low, ωl, or high,
ωh, for every t spanning from 1 to T.
2) Every period t, agent N chooses the level of some action at no cost.
3) Every period t, before taking action, agent N receives one message pt from
agent E, with pt ∈ [0,1]. Message pt is the probability, announced by agent E,
that ωt is ωl.
4) Current action and current state yield current output. The expected undis-
counted sum of per-period outputs is maximised by the following optimal action
rule: choose always the level of current action in constant proportion with respect
to the probability that the current state is low.
5) Both agents share the same objective in 4) and are aware of the optimal
action rule.
6) Only after the current action has already been implemented, both the
agents observe the realization of the state of the world for the same period.
Under Assumption 1, for T periods agent N and agent E are engaged in
a joint activity. That joint activity yields per-period outputs that depend on
both the current state and the current action. The set of states is binary.
8Agent N is a decision-maker in that he has complete control over the relevant
action, while agent E is an expert in that he is the source of messages stating
the probability of a particular state for the current period.
The agents share a common objective and know the action rule optimal for
that common aim. In particular, the optimal current action is simply propor-
tional to the probability that the current state is low.
The assumption that the agents are solidaristic and know the optimal action
rule serves the purpose of focusing attention on the interplay between agent N’s
beliefs and agent E’s messages. That interplay may have a dynamic evolution
since both the agents are supposed to observe the realization of the state of the
world at the end of every period.
In particular, from Assumption 1, agent N will choose the current action in
the correct proportion with respect to his posterior probability that the current
state is ωl. The matter just lies in agent N’s beliefs, that satisfy the following
Assumption.
Assumption 2 :
1) At the beginning of every period, agent N’s prior probability that the
current state is low is always equal to 0.5.
2) Agent N considers a message pt as the outcome of the random variable
Pt in the sample space [0,1]. Moreover, agent N believes that all messages
from a particular expert are characterized by a unique parameter α from the
parameter set A such that pr(pt,ωt = ωx | α) is well deﬁned for every α, pt
and x, with x = l,h. Finally, agent N believes that the messages of the same
expert at diﬀerent times form a random sample, conditional on the realization of
the same state of the world: provided the true state is always ωx and messages
come from the same expert from time 1 to time n, then P1,P2,...Pn are i.i.d.
with common likelihood function l(p | ωx,α), where l(p | ωx,α) is always non-
negative for p ∈ [0,1], and
  1
0 l(p | ωx,α)dp is equal to 1.
3) At the initial period, agent N considers agent E an experiment of unknown
parameter α, where α belongs to the non-singular parameter set A. Agent N
believes that his advisor’s parameter is a drawing from the distribution func-
tion G1 of α, with corresponding non-degenerate density function g1 (α) on the
parameter set A.
Under Assumption 2, the relationship between agent E and agent N springs
from agent N’s uncertainty about the current state of the world. Agent N’s
uncertainty is substantial for two reasons. First, agent N’s prior probability
that the current state is low is always 0.5; hence, agent N believes that the
states at diﬀerent periods are stochastically independent, and his uncertainty is
the highest at the beginning of every period. Second, agent N looks at an expert
as a source of messages with a systematic and unknown component represented
by parameter α.
9Let pr(ωl | p,α) denote agent N’s posterior probability that ωt is ωl, given
pt equal to p and α, i.e.:
pr(ωl | p,α) =
l(p | ωl,α)
l(p | ωl,α) + l(p | ωh,α)
(1)
The α parameters are a measure of the alignment of agent N’s beliefs to the
opinion stated by agent E because they satisfy the following condition:
Condition 1 : the parameters αi and αj are connected by the binary relation
R1, denoted by ≤1, such that:
1) αj ≤1 αi if and only if:
|p − pr(ωl | p,αi)| ≤ |p − pr(ωl | p,αj)| ∨ p ∈ [0,1]
2) αj <1 αi if and only if αj ≤1 αi and αi ￿1 αj
3) αj =1 αi if and only if αj ≤1 αi and αi ≤1 αj
From Assumption 2 point 2), all the messages received by the same expert are
supposed to be random variables with identical density function, l(p | ωx,α),
conditional on the true state ωx and parameter α. Under Condition 1, the
α parameter is a measure of reliability in that it is related to the distance
between agent N’s posterior beliefs and agent E’s messages. In particular, if
αj <1 αi, then, for some message p, |p − pr(ωl | p,αi)| will be lower than
|p − pr(ωl | p,αj)|: agent N’s beliefs will be closer to the opinion from αi than
to the messages from αj. In this sense, if αj <1 αi, agent N will associate
greater trust/reliability to αi than to αj.
Let ˜ α denote the particular parameter satisfying the following condition:
pr(ωl | p, ˜ α) = p ∨ p ∈ [0,1] (2)
In other words, given ˜ α, agent N will adopt the received message as his own
belief. Parameter ˜ α corresponds to the case of perfect calibration. It follows
that ˜ α ≥1 α for every α in A.
Finally, say that a set C is completely ordered by a binary relation ≤ if and
only if: a) cj < ci or b) ci < cj or c) cj = ci, for every cj,ci ∈ C. The following
Assumption will be made:
Assumption 3 :
1) the parameter set A is completely ordered by relation R1 from Condition
1
2) the parameter ˜ α in (2) belongs to A
3) l(p | ωl,α) is a continuous, diﬀerentiable and nondecreasing function of
p
4) l(p | ωh,α) = l(1 − p | ωl,α) for every p and α
Under Assumption 3, any two α parameters can be related through R1
in terms of opinion reliability in the sense explained just above. Moreover,
10Assumption 3 speciﬁes some properties of the likelihood functions l(p | ωx,α).
In particular, agent N will believe that the probability, conditional on α, that
p is announced at time t is positively related to the level of p when the current
state is low, while it is negatively related to the level of p when the current state
is high.
Now, consider the following condition for the weak property of monotone
likelihood ratio:
Condition 2 : the parameters αi and αj are connected by the binary relation
R2, denoted by ≤2, such that :






∀ pk > pz (3)
2) αj <2 αi if and only if αj ≤2 αi and αi ￿2 αj
3) αj =2 αi if and only if αj ≤2 αi and αi ≤2 αj
The following Lemma shows that relation R2 is compatible with relation R1.
In particular:
Lemma 1 : when A is completely ordered by relation R2 from Condition 2,
then αj <2 αi will imply that αj <1 αi
Proof. In the Appendix.
Given Lemma 1, the following Assumption will be made:
Assumption 4 : the parameter set A is completely ordered by relation R2 from
Condition 2
Given Lemma 1 and Assumption 2 point 3), let the distribution function G1
of α in be deﬁned on the parameter set A completely ordered by either R1 or
R2.
The model of the expert adopted by agent N will correspond to the dis-
tribution of parameter α. Agent E’s reputation will be represented by agent
N’s density function for parameter α. The reputation for credibility enjoyed by
agent E will determine the relationship between agent E’s message and agent
N’s posterior probability that the current state is low. At time t, given gt (α),
agent N will believe that the probability that agent E announces pt equal to
p, conditional on the current state ωt being ωl, denoted by l(p | ωl,gt (α)), is
equal to:
l(p | ωl,gt (α)) =
 
A
l(p | ωl,α)gt (α)dα (4)
The credibility of agent E’s messages for agent N is a necessary intermediary
step for the computation of agent N’s posterior probability that the current state
ωt is ωl, given pt = p, i.e.:
11pr(ωl | p,gt (α)) =
l(p | ωl,gt (α))
l(p | ωl,gt (α)) + l(p | ωh,gt (α))
(5)
From (4), since at the end of period t the realization of the state of the world
for the same period, ωt, is public information, agent N will update his model
of agent E for period (t + 1). Agent N will compute a new density function of
α, gt+1 (α | ωx,p), that is equal to:
gt+1 (α | ωx,p) =
gt (α)l(p | ωx,α)
l(p | ωx,gt (α))
given ωt = ωx and pt = p (6)
As far as agent E is concerned, the following Assumption will be made:
Assumption 5 : agent E knows agent N’s prior probability that ωt is ωl, and
the density functions g1 (α) and l(p | ωx,α) for every ωx and α. Every period t
agent E can attach a probability ¯ pt to the event that ωt is ωl.
Under Assumption 5 , agent E can compute agent N’s posterior probability
that the current state is low, i.e. pr(ωl | p,gt (α)) in (5). Hence, agent N’s
behaviour will be perfectly predictable by agent E, who can treat agent N as a
sort of Stackelberg follower. In other words, agent E will have correct second
order beliefs with respect to agent N. Contrarily to most models of expert
behaviour, agent E’s true probability that the current state is low, ¯ pt, will be
interpreted just as agent E’s conﬁdence that the current state is low. In this
sense, the α parameters will be relevant for agent E in as much as they aﬀect
agent N’s beliefs, and not because they represent the rank through which agent
E measures his own information.
Let V (pt | gt (α)) denote the squared diﬀerence between ¯ pt and agent N’s
posterior probability that ωt is ωl, given pt = p and gt (α) in (5), i.e.:
V (pt | gt (α)) = [¯ pt − pr(ωl | p,gt (α))]
2 (7)
Finally, let pt denote the vector of messages from time t to time T, i.e.:
pt = (pt,pt+1,...,pT) (8)
Given Assumption 1, solidarity between the agents and knowledge of the
optimal action rule will make agent E concerned with the distance between his
true probability ¯ pt that the current state is low and agent N’s probability of
the same event. Indeed, that distance is related to the diﬀerence between the
optimal action according to agent E and the optimal action according to agent
N. It follows that agent E’s expected payoﬀ at time t, denoted by πt (pt), can
be represented by the following function:

















The following Lemma shows that under the monotone likelihood ratio property
the following results hold:
1) when the current state is low, the probability that a message lower than
p is announced will never be greater conditional on αi than conditional on αj if
αj ≤2 αi;
2) agent N will interpret higher α as more informative experiments;
3) provided ωl has occurred at time t, the posterior density function of α
conditional on higher messages at time t will dominate in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance the posterior density function of α conditional on lower
messages at time t.
In particular, let L(p | ωl,α) denote the distribution function associated to
l(p | ωl,α), i.e.:




The following can be proved:
Lemma 2 :
1) given αi >2 αj, L(p | ωl,αi) ≤ L(p | ωl,αj) for every p
2) experiment αi is suﬃcient for experiment αj.
3) given gt (α), αi > αj and pk > pz, then gt+1 (α) in (6) is such that:
gt+1 (αi | ωl,pk)
gt+1 (αi | ωl,pz)
≥
gt+1 (αj | ωl,pk)
gt+1 (αj | ωl,pz)
(10)
Gt+1 (α | ωl,pk) ≤ Gt+1 (α | ωl,pz) ∀α (11)
Gt+1 (α | ωh,pk) ≥ Gt+1 (α | ωh,pz) ∀α
Proof. In the Appendix.
In order to handle an easier notation, let agent N’s posterior probability that
ωt is ωl, given pt and gt (α), in (5), be represented by the function kt (pt | gt (α)),
i.e.:
pr(ωl | pt,gt (α)) = kt (pt | gt (α)) (12)
Under Assumption 3 points 3) and 4), kt (pt | gt (α)) in (12) is non-decreasing
in pt.
Let ˇ A denote the subset of A such that l(p | ωl,α) is increasing in p, i.e.:
ˇ A = {α | l(pk | ωl,α) > l(pz | ωl,α) for every pk > pz} (13)
The following Lemma shows that, provided some condition on the prior
density function of α are satisﬁed, kt (pt | gt (α)) will always be strictly positive,
lower than 1 and invertible. Moreover, kt (pt | gt (α)) will not be lower (higher)
13than pt if pt is lower (higher) than 0.5. Finally, provided ωl has occurred at time
t, the higher the message at time t, the greater will be the range of the domain
of the inverse function k−1
t . When Gt (α) dominates G′
t (α) in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance, the range of the domain of the inverse function k
−1
t
will be smaller under G′
t (α) than Gt (α). In particular:
Lemma 3 : provided gt (α) is non-degenerate on ˜ α and is positive for some α
in ˇ A, then:
1) kt (pt | gt (α)) ∈ (0,1)
2) kt (pt | gt (α)) is increasing in pt, and so invertible.
3) kt (pt | gt (α)) ≥ pt for every pt in (0,0.5) and kt (pt | gt (α)) ≤ pt for
every pt in (0.5,1)
4) provided Gt (α) ≤ G′
t (α) for every α, then:
kt (0 | gt (α)) < kt (0 | g′
t (α)) ≤ kt (1 | g′
t (α)) < kt (1 | gt (α)) (14)
5) for every pk > pz:
kt+1 (0 | gt+1 (α | ωl,pk)) < kt+1 (0 | gt+1 (α | ωl,pz)) (15)
kt+1 (1 | gt+1 (α | ωl,pk)) > kt+1 (1 | gt+1 (α | ωl,pz))
Proof. In the Appendix.
5 Message Rule for One Period Ahead
In the one-period case, agent E will announce pT in order to minimize the
distance between his own probability that the current state is low and agent




V (pT | gT (α)) = [¯ pT − kT (pT | gT (α))]
2 (16)
Let k−1
T (¯ pT | gT (α)) denote the inverse function of kT (pT | gT (α)). Let p∗
T
denote the solution to the problem in (16). The following can be proved:
Proposition 1 : provided gT (α) is positive for some α in ˇ A in (13), agent E
will adopt the following message rule:
p∗
T = 0 if ¯ pT ∈ [0,kT (0 | gT (α))] (17)
p∗
T = k−1
T (¯ pT | gT (α)) if ¯ pT ∈ (kT (0 | gT (α)),kT (1 | gT (α)))
p∗
T = 1 if ¯ pT ∈ [kT (1 | gT (α)),1]
Proof. In the Appendix.
14Corollary 1 : 1)
V (p∗
T | gT (α)) > 0 if ¯ pT / ∈ (kT (0 | gT (α)),kT (1 | gT (α)))
2) given Gt (α) ≤ G′
t (α) for every α, then:
E [V (p∗
T | gT (α))] < E [V (p∗
T | g′
T (α))] (18)
3) under the message rule in (17), it will be that:
p∗
T < ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (0,kT (kT (0 | gT (α)) | gT (α))] (19)
p∗
T ≤ ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (kT (kT (0 | gT (α)) | gT (α)),0.5)
p∗
T = ¯ pT if ¯ pT = 0.5
p∗
T ≥ ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (0.5,kT (kT (1 | gT (α)) | gT (α)))
p∗
T > ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (kT (kT (1 | gT (α)) | gT (α)),1)
4) when gT (α) is positive for some α such that:
l(pk | ωl, ˜ α)




for every pk > pz (20)
then:
p∗
T < ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (0,0.5) (21)
p∗
T > ¯ pT if ¯ pT ∈ (0.5,1)
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that agent N’s posterior belief will be perfectly aligned
to agent E’s true belief only if agent E’s true probability belongs to the open
interval between kT (0 | gT (α)) and kT (1 | gT (α)). Otherwise, agent E will
prefer to announce one of the extreme values that his messages can take.
From Corollary 1, distortion in the announced probability from agent E’s
true probability will always occurs for some values of agent E’s beliefs, notwith-
standing solidarity between the agents. Moreover, distortion will always prevail,
except for the case in which ¯ pT = 0.5, if some α parameters satisfy the strong
property of monotone likelihood ratio.
Distortion will work in the following way: agent E will announce a low-state
probability that is smaller than his true belief, when he is less conﬁdent than a
low state will occur; instead, agent E will announce a low-state probability that
is greater than his true belief, when he is more conﬁdent than a low state will
occur. The reason is this: when agent N does not certainly believe that agent
E is perfectly calibrated, then agent E will exaggerate his messages in order to
make them ”loud and clear”.
The worse is agent E’s reputation according to agent N, i.e. the worse is
the distribution function of α in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
the greater will be both the distortion in the announced probability and the loss
expected by agent E, just because agent N is more insensitive to messages.
156 Message Rules for Two Periods Ahead
For the two-period case, at (T − 1) agent E will work out his optimal message
rules for both period (T − 1) and T. From (8), (7), (9) and (12), agent E will
plan to announce pT−1 in order to solve the following problem:
min
pT−1
V (pT−1 | gT−1 (α)) + (22)
+¯ pT−1E [V (pT | gT (α) | ωl,pT−1)] +
+¯ qT−1E [V (pT | gT (α) | ωh,pT−1)]
where ¯ qT−1 = (1 − ¯ pT−1).
Given Proposition 1, since the optimal message rule for period T corresponds
to (17), the problem in (22) can be replaced by the following one:
min
pT−1
[¯ pT−1 − kT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α))]
2 + (23)






[¯ pT − kT (0 | gT (α | ωx,pT−1))]





[¯ pT − kT (1 | gT (α | ωx,pT−1))]
2 f (¯ pT | ¯ pT−1)d¯ pT
with x = l,h.
From (23) and Lemma 3 point 5), the opinion announced by agent E at time
(T − 1) will have both a direct impact on agent N’s beliefs at time (T − 1), and
an indirect impact on the reputation enjoyed by agent E at time T. Credibility
will be relevant for agent E in as much as it fosters the future alignment of
agent N’s beliefs to agent E’s stated opinions.
Condition 3 :
       
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1











16Let ˜ pT−1 denote the solution to the problem in (23). The following can be
proved:
Proposition 2 : provided gT (α) is positive for some α in ˇ A in (13), if Con-
dition 3 holds, agent E will adopt the following message rule at (T − 1):
˜ pT−1 = 0 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ [0,z]
˜ pT−1 < ¯ pT−1 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ (z,0.5)
˜ pT−1 = 0.5 if ¯ pT−1 = 0.5
˜ pT−1 > ¯ pT−1 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ (0.5,y)
˜ pT−1 = 1 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ [y,1]
where:
0 < z < kT−1 (0 | gT−1 (α)) (24)
1 > y > kT−1 (1 | gT−1 (α))
Proof. In the Appendix.
Corollary 2 : the message rule in Proposition 2 will be such that:
˜ pT−1 > p∗
T−1 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ (z,0.5)
˜ pT−1 < p∗
T−1 if ¯ pT−1 ∈ (0.5,y)
where p∗
T−1 is the optimal message rule for the one-period case proved by
Proposition 1.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As Proposition 2 shows, in the two-period case, agent E may face a trade-oﬀ
between leading agent N to have correct posterior belief in the ﬁrst period, and
improving his own reputation in the second period. It follows that agent E will
keep on exaggerating his report only when his true probability of a low state
are suﬃciently extreme.
As Corollary 2 proves, distortion at (T − 1) will be less severe than it would
be if it were the last period of interaction. Indeed, when agent E is suﬃciently
uncertain about the current state, to exaggerate his announced opinion will
adversely aﬀect his expected reputation at the last period. In order to preserve
credibility, and so to keep control over future expected losses tomorrow, agent
E will accept a higher expected loss today.
Then, repeated interaction will make agent E concerned about the reliability
of his reports. As a result, messages will less biased with respect to the true
beliefs of the sender.
Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated through the following example.
17Example 1 Suppose that:
1) A ∈ [0,1]
2) gt (α) : Et [α] =  t V art (α) = σ2
t
3) l(pt | ωl,α) = 1 − α(1 − 2pt)
4) l(pt | ωh,α) = 1 + α(1 − 2pt)
Hence:
kt (pt | gt (α))
=
 
A [1 − α(1 − 2pt)]gt (α)dα
 
A [1 − α(1 − 2pt)]gt (α)dα +
 
A [1 + α(1 − 2pt)]gt (α)dα
=
1 −  t (1 − 2pt)
2
From Proposition 1, in the one-period case the message rule will be the fol-
lowing:
p∗
T = 0 if ¯ pT ∈
 
0,






2¯ pT − 1 +  T
2 T
if ¯ pT ∈
 
1 −  T
2
,




T = 1 if ¯ pT ∈
 




For the two-period case, given:
gT (α | ωl,pT−1) =
[1 − α(1 − 2pT−1)]gT−1 (α)
1 −  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
E [α | gT (α | ωl,pT−1)] =
 
T−1 − (1 − 2pT−1)
 
σ2
T−1 +  2
T−1
 












1 +  
T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)






T−1 +  2
T−1
 





it will be that:
kT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1)) (26)
=
1 − 2 T−1 (1 − pT−1) + (1 − 2pT−1)
 
σ2





1 −  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
 
kT (0 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1)) =
1 − 2 T−1pT−1 − (1 − 2pT−1)
 
σ2





1 +  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
 
(27)




1 −  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
2
 




1 −  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)




1 +  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
 2 [Mh (pT−1) − Nh (pT−1)]
From (26) − (27) it follows that:
kT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1)) > kT (0 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1)) if pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5)
kT (1 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1)) < kT (1 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1)) if pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5)


















1 −  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
  >
1  
1 +  T−1 (1 − 2pT−1)
 , Condition 3 is
satisﬁed. (28) is lower than zero and ˜ pT−1 is strictly greater than p∗
T−1.
7 Conclusions
The paper shows that the opinion announced by an expert can be distorted
from his true beliefs in the interaction with a solidaristic non-expert. The time
horizon of interaction is proved to have an impact on the level of bias in messages.
The basic interaction analysed in the paper between an expert and a decision-
maker can represent the relationship between a manager and his subordinate
when instructions are issued from the former to the latter. Often, indeed, the
subordinate cannot but take instructions very much like the opinion of the
sender, and opinions are always objectionable.
The model may be extended in diﬀerent ways. Two directions of future
research are the analysis of many activities and so of diﬀerent types of action,
and the case of a non-binary set of states of the world11.
11An additional problem is the coherent combination of experts’ opinions. For an extensive
review of the subject, see Genest-Zidek (1986) and Clemen-Winkler (1999).
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9 Appendix
Proof. of Lemma 1:
Given αi,αj ∈ A, let Bij and Cij be the sets deﬁned as follows:
Bij = {p | l(p | ωl,αi) < l(p | ωl,αj)} (29)
Cij = {p | l(p | ωl,αi) > l(p | ωl,αj)}
Given αi  =1 αj, there will be one p at least such that l(p | ωl,αi)  =
l(p | ωl,αj), since
  1
0 l(p | ωx,α)dp = 1 for every α. Given continuity of l(p | ωl,α)
for every α, the sets deﬁned in (29) are non-empty and non-singular for any
21αi  =1 αj. Hence:








αj <2 αi → pB < pC (31)
Let α2L denote the particular parameter satisfying the following condition:
α2L ≤2 α ∀α ∈ A\α2L
Let αm denote the particular parameter satisfying the following condition:
l(p | ωl,αm) = 2 ∀p ∈ [0,1] (32)
Suppose α2L <2 αm. Given (30)






Given (31), l(p | ωl,α2L) should be decreasing for some p, contrarily to As-
sumption 3 point 3). Hence, αm ≤2 α2L. If αm ∈ A, then αm =2 α2L. If
αm / ∈ A, then αm <2 α2L.
Consider any αi >2 αm. Since:






→ l(pC | ωl,αi) > l(pB | ωl,αi)
it follows that:
l(p | ωl,α) is increasing for some p for every α  = αm (33)
Hence:
l(p | ωl,αj) − l(p′ | ωl,αj) > 0 →
l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p′ | ωl,αi) > 0 ∨ αi >2 αj
Given αi >2 αj






∀p < pB (34)
→ l(p | ωl,αj) > l(p | ωl,αi) ∀p < pB
→ p ∈ Bij
Let ˆ p and ˇ p denote the lowest and the highest p such that:
l(p | ωl,αj) = l(p | ωl,αi)
22From (34):
αi >2 αj → Bij = [0, ˆ p) and Cij = (ˇ p,1] (35)
Hence:
l(0 | ωl,αi) ≥ 0 → l(0 | ωl,αj) > 0 ∀αj <2 αi (36)
Consider ˜ α. By deﬁnition, l(0 | ωl, ˜ α) = 0 and l(p | ωl, ˜ α) > 0 for every p
in (0,1]. Suppose that αj >2 ˜ α for some αj ∈ A. In that case, (36) would be
violated. Hence:
˜ α >2 α ∨ α ∈ A\˜ α (37)
Since the sum of continuous functions is a continuous function, and the
ratio of continuous functions is a continuous function, provided the denominator
function is never zero, then pr(ωl | p,α) is a continuous function of p, from
(36) − (37).
Moreover, pr(ωl | p,α) is a nondecreasing function of p such that pr(ωl | 1,α)
is greater than pr(ωl | 0,α) for every α  = αm from (33).








∨ p ∈ M
→ pr(ωl | p,αi) ≥ pr(ωl | p,αj) ∨ p ∈ M
αj < 2αi and pr(ωl | p,αi) > pr(ωl | p,αj)
→ pr(ωl | p′,αi) > pr(ωl | p′,αj) ∨ p′ ∈ (p,1] ∨ p ∈ M
αj < 2αi (38)
→ pr(ωl | p,αi) > pr(ωl | p,αj) ∨ p ∈ M ∩ Cij
Let N be the closed set of p between 0 and 0.5. It can be shown that:
αj < 2αi (39)
→ pr(ωl | p,αj) > pr(ωl | p,αi) ∨ p ∈ N ∩ Bij
Given (37), (38) and (39):
αi >2 αj → αi >1 αj
Proof. of Lemma 2:
Point 1): given αi >2 αj and (29), from Lehmann (1986, p.85), given a
nondecreasing function ψ of p, if b = supBijψ(p) and c = infCijψ(p), then
23c − b ≥ 0 and:
 
P








ψ(p)[l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]dp
From the weighted mean-value theorem for integrals, since [l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]
never changes sign in Bij and Cij, then:
 
Bij




[l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]dp pB ∈ Bij
 
Cij





























[l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]dp
= (c − b)
 
Cij
[l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]dp ≥ 0
it follows that:
 
P ψ(p)[l(p | ωl,αi) − l(p | ωl,αj)]dp ≥ 0 →
E [ψ(p) | ωl,αi] ≥ E [ψ(p) | ωl,αj] (40)
24Consider a nondecreasing function ϕ of p such that:
ϕ(p) = 1 if p > ¯ p
ϕ(p) = 0 otherwise
From (40):
L(p | ωl,αi) ≤ L(p | ωl,αj) for every p (41)




in p for every α. Hence:
  t
0
l(p | ωl,α)dp : error of the I type ﬁxed at t (42)
  1
t
l(p | ωh,α)dp =
  1−t
0
l(p | ωl,α)dp: error of the II type given t
Given αi >2 αj, consider experiment k such that:
l(p | ωl,k) = l(p | ωl,αj) (43)
l(p | ωh,k) = l(p | ωh,αi)
Blackwell (1953)12 shows that experiment β is more informative than exper-
iment γ, denoted by β ⊃ γ, if and only if at every level t the error of the II
type with β is less than or equal to the corresponding error with γ. Compare
experiment k to experiment αj. From (41) and (43) it follows that:
  t
0
l(p | ωl,k)dp =
  t
0
l(p | ωl,αj)dp (44)
  1
t
l(p | ωh,k)dp =
  1−t
0




→ k ⊃ αj
Now, compare experiment k to experiment αi:
  1
t






l(p | ωl,αi)dp ≤
  t
0
l(p | ωl,k)dp =
  t
0
l(p | ωl,αj)dp from(41)
→ αi ⊃ k ⊃ αj
Point 3): consider two density functions of α, g(α) and g′ (α) such that
g (α)
g′ (α)
is nondecreasing in α. Let D and E be sets deﬁned as follows:
D = {α | g(α) < g′ (α)}
E = {α | g(α) > g′ (α)}
12DeGroot (1962, 1979) provides a detailed analysis of the concept of suﬃcient experiments.
25Given a nondecreasing function ψ of α, if d = supDψ(α) and e = infEψ(α),
then e − d ≥ 0 and:
 
A




ψ(α)[g (α) − g′ (α)]dα +
 
E
ψ(α)[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα
From the weighted mean-value theorem for integrals, since [g (α) − g′ (α)]
never changes sign in D and in E, then:
 
D




[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα αD ∈ D
 
E









[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα ≥ d
 
D




[g (α) − g′ (α)]dα ≥ e
 
E




[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα + e
 
E
[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα
= (e − d)
 
E
[g (α) − g′ (α)]dα ≥ 0
it follows that:
 
A ψ(α)[g(α) − g′ (α)]dα ≥ 0 →
E [ψ(α) | g (α)] ≥ E [ψ(α) | g′ (α)]
Consider a nondecreasing function ϕ of α such that:
ϕ(α) = 1 if α > ¯ α




nondecreasing in α → G(α) ≤ G′ (α) for every α (45)
26Given αi >2 αj and pk > pz, and:
gt+1 (α | ωl,pk)





A l(pz | ωl,α)gt (α)dα
 







→ (10) → (11)
Proof. of Lemma 3:
Points 1) and 2): provided gt (α) is non-degenerate on ˜ α, then from (36):
0 < kt (0 | gt (α))
1 > kt (1 | gt (α))
Provided gt (α) > 0 for some α in ˇ A, then kt (pt | gt (α)) is increasing in pt.
Hence, kt (pt | gt (α)) is invertible.
Point 3): under R2:
l(1 − p | ωl, ˜ α)





l(1 − p | ωl,α)
l(p | ωl,α)





l(p | ωl,α)gT (α)dα ≥ p
 
A
l(p | ωh,α)gT (α)dα ∨ p ∈ (0,0.5)
Point 4): given αi >2 αj and (35), then:
l(0 | ωl,α) is decreasing in α, ∨ α  = αm
l(0 | ωh,αi) is increasing in α, ∨ α  = αm
where αm is deﬁned in (32). It follows that:
 
A
l(0 | ωl,α)g(α)dα <
 
A
l(0 | ωl,α)g′ (α)dα (46)
 
A
l(0 | ωh,α)g(α)dα >
 
A
l(0 | ωh,α)g′ (α)dα
(14) follows from (46).
Point 5): (15) follows from (10) and (14).
Proof. of Proposition 1:
from Lemma 3 points 1) and 2), V (pT | gT (α)) is:
a) always positive and decreasing in pT if ¯ pT < kT (0 | gT (α))
b) always zero if pT = k−1
T (¯ pT | gT (α)) and ¯ p1 ∈ [kT (0 | gT (α)),kT (1 | gT (α))]
27c) always positive and increasing in pT if ¯ pT > kT (1 | gT (α)).
Consequently, (17) is the optimal message rule of agent E.
Proof. of Corollary 1:
Point 1): it follows from (17).
Point 2): (18) follows from Lemma 3 point 4)
Point 3): (19) follows from Lemma 3 point 3).
Point 4): given Lemma 3 point 3), under (20):
l(1 − p | ωl, ˜ α)





l(1 − p | ωl,α)
l(p | ωl,α)





l(p | ωl,α)gT (α)dα > p
 
A
l(p | ωh,α)gT (α)dα ∨ p ∈ (0,0.5)
kT (pt | gT (α)) > pt ∨ pt ∈ [0,0.5) (47)
kT (pt | gT (α)) < pt ∨ pt ∈ (0.5,1]
(21) is the consequence of (47).
Proof. of Proposition 2:
The ﬁrst derivative of (23) is:
−2
ϑkT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α))
ϑpT−1
[¯ pT−1 − kT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α))] + (48)
−2
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
¯ pT−1Ml (pT−1) +
−2
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
¯ pT−1Nl (pT−1) +
−2
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
¯ qT−1Mh (pT−1) +
−2













[¯ pT − kT (1 | gT (α | ωx,pT−1))]f (¯ pT | ¯ pT−1)d¯ pT
28with x = l,h
From Lemma 3 point 2):
ϑkT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α))
ϑpT−1
> 0
From Lemma 3 point 4):
pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5) → Ml (pT−1) < Mh (pT−1) < 0, Nl (pT−1) > Nh(pT−1) > 0
From Lemma 3 point 5):
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
< 0
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
> 0
Under Assumption 3 point 4):
kT (1 | gT (α | ωx,pT−1)) = [1 − kT (0 | gT (α | ωx,pT−1))]
Hence, Condition 3 implies that:






       
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
       
 
A
l(pT−1 | ωh,α)dα ∀pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5)
consequently:
−
       
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
       Ml (pT−1)
 
A
l(pT−1 | ωl,α)dα + (49)
+












l(pT−1 | ωh,α)dα +
+
       
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1







       
ϑkT (0 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
       Ml (pT−1) +
+
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωl,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
Nl (pT−1) is decreasing in pT−1
29−




       
ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
       Nh (pT−1) is increasing in pT−1
when pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5), it follows that:
a) when pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5), there exists a z such that:
¯ pT−1












ϑkT (1 | gT (α | ωh,pT−1))
ϑpT−1
Nh (pT−1) +
+[kT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α)) − ¯ pT−1]
ϑkT−1 (pT−1 | gT−1 (α))
ϑpT−1
evaluated at pT−1 = z
b) when pT−1 ∈ [0,0.5):
¯ pT−1 ∈ [z,0.5) → ¯ pT−1 > ˜ pT−1
The proof is analogous for the case in which pT−1 ∈ (0.5,1].
Proof. of Corollary 2:
From (49) it follows that:
¯ pT−1 ∈ [kT−1 (0 | gT−1 (α)),0.5) → ˜ pT−1 > k
−1
T−1 (¯ pT−1 | gT−1 (α)) = p∗
T−1
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